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Recent Developments 
Sterry v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation: 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY OUTSIDE 
OF THE WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSA nON ACT 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land held that the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act (Act) did not provide the exclu-
sive remedy for alleged aggravation of a 
work-related injury if the aggravation was 
a result of intentional medical malpractice. 
In Sterry v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 
64 Md. App. 175, 494 A.2d 748 (1985), 
the court ruled that an employee has an op-
tion to bring a common law action against 
his employer under MD ANN. CODE 
art. 10 1, § 44 (1957), when his work-related 
injuries are aggravated by the intentional 
medical malpractice of his employer through 
his employer's physicians. 
Mr. Sterry, a Bethlehem Steel employee, 
injured his back at his place of work in 
September, 1970. He was hospitalized be-
cause of the injury but returned to work 
in December, 1970. On his return he be-
gan receiving follow-up medical care from 
the company physician. The follow-up 
medical care was supplied by Bethlehem 
Steel in compliance with MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 101, § 37(a)(1957). In August, 
1971, Mr. Sterry filed for and began re-
ceiving workmen's compensation pay-
ments for his injury and he continued un-
der the care of the company physician until 
June, 1979 when he voluntarily ceased 
treatment. His treatment during these 
eight and one half years consisted primar-
ily of prescription medication for pain 
alleviation. He was referred to a neurolo-
gist and neurosurgeon for evaluation of his 
continued pain in 1978. Both consulting 
physicians notified the company doctor 
that they felt Mr. Sterry was addicted to 
his pain medication. -In September, 1979, 
a myelogram performed at the direction of 
the neurosurgeon was diagnostic of several 
ruptured vertebral discs. Mr. Sterry un-
derwent spinal surgery and an unsuccess-
ful detoxification program while under the 
care of the neurosurgeon. Mr. Sterry re-
tired in 1980. 
Suit was brought by Mr. Sterry in the 
Circuit Court of Baltimore County alleg-
ing that the Bethlehem Steel physician 
caused him to become addicted to narcotics 
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during treatment of his work-related in-
jury. The court granted Bethlehem Steel's 
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, 
the appellant claimed that he was not lim-
ited to compensation under the Act for 
aggravation of his injuries and his drug 
addiction because they were due to inten-
tional acts of fraud and malpractice by 
Bethlehem Steel and its physicians to keep 
Mr. Sterry working and unaware of the 
extent of his medical problems. Under 
Section 44 if an injury results from the 
"deliberate intention of his employer to 
produce such injury," the employee will 
have the option of receiving workmen's 
compensation or of bringing a common 
law action against the employer. Under 
this section the court held that if the alle-
gations are "sufficient to state a claim for 
the deliberate intention of appellee to pro-
duce the injury," the appellant is able to 
bring a civil suit against the appellee. 
Sterry v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 64 Md. 
App. at 188. 
Prior to the Sterry decision, workmen's 
compensation was held to be the exclusive 
remedy for aggravation of workplace in-
juries due to physician or hospital mal-
practice. Larson, Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, § 13.21 (1979). In Nazario v. 
Washington Adventist Hospita~ Inc., 45 
Md. App. 243, 412 A.2d 1271 (1980), the 
court noted that this doctrine was "uni-
versally held" and that "the court could see 
no reason Maryland should not follow 
the universal rule." !d. at 246, 412 A.2d 
at 1273. 
In the Sterry case, however, the court 
did not rely on Nazario but referred exten-
sively to Young v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity, 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 
(1985), a decision in which the court found 
that the appellant was not limited to com-
pensation under the Act by her employer's 
compensation insurer for alleged inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress be-
cause it was an intentional act. The appel-
lant had been assaulted at work and claimed 
both physical and emotional injury as a 
result. Hartford asked that the appellant 
be examined by a psychiatrist of their 
choice on the issue of emotional injury. 
The appellant's private psychiatrist warned 
Hartford that she had attempted suicide 
previously and that having to submit to a 
second exam might cause further psycho-
logical stress. Four days after the required 
psychiatric exam, the appellant attempted 
suicide. She then brought suit alleging 
that Hartford "intended to inflict emo-
tional distress in order to cause her to drop 
the claim or commit suicide." Young, 303 
Md. at 189. There was no claim in this suit 
of medical malpractice, and in fact, the ex-
amining physician found that her emo-
tional trauma was real and compensable. 
The court of appeals ruled that this allega-
tion of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress satisfied the criteria of Art. 101 
§ 44 and allowed her to bring a common 
law action against Hartford. 
Sterry is the third in a series of recent 
cases which demonstrate the Maryland 
courts' willingness to limit the scope of the 
exclusivity clause. In Young v. Hartford, 
supra, and a similar case decided the same 
day, Gallagher v. Bituminous Fire and Ma-
rine Insurance Co., 303 Md. 201 492 A.2d 
1280 (1985), the court held that a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress 
by the employer is not precluded from a 
civil tort action. Several months later, in 
Sterry, the court allowed the plaintiff to 
evade the "universally held" doctrine that 
medical malpractice in a workmen's com-
pensation case is exclusively compensable 
under the Act. By permitting a semantic 
manipulation alleging intentional medical 
malpractice, the court appears to provide 
another manner of egress from the con-
fines of the exclusivity clause. 
-Malinda S. Siegel 
Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co.: 
CONTRmUTORY NEGLIGENCE-
STILL A COMPLETE BAR TO 
RECOVERY 
In Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 
303 Md. 619, 495 A.2d 838 (1985), the 
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a 
dump truck operator who was aware of 
overhead power lines, but nevertheless was 
electrically shocked when his truck came 
in close proximity to the lines, was guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. In so holding, the court affirmed the 
lower court's decision to grant the defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment. 
In Liscombe the plaintiff, Robert D. 
Liscombe, received a severe electric shock 
when he raised the bed of his tractor-trailer 
dump truck into overhead electric lines be-
longing to the defendant, Potomac Edi-
son. The injury occurred while Liscombe 
was delivering a load of sand to the co-
defendant, Hagerstown Block, on property 
owned by Martin-Marietta. Liscombe filed 
suit against Potomac Edison and Hagers-
town Block for compensatory and punitive 
damages for his injuries allegedly sustained 
because of the defendants' gross negli-
gence. Motions for summary judgment 
were filed by Potomac Edison and Hagers-
town Block on the ground that Liscombe 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. The circuit court granted the defen-
dants' motions for summary judgment, and 
Liscombe appealed to the court of special 
appeals. The court of appeals granted cer-
tiorari before any consideration by the 
intermediate appellate court. 
On appeal Liscombe alleged that the 
trial court erred in finding contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, and in the 
alternative that contributory negligence is 
not a defense where the tort is alleged to be 
based on wanton or reckless conduct. Lis-
combe also contended that the trial court 
erred in refusing to permit the issue oflast 
clear chance to go to the jury. 
Liscombe claimed that there were three 
areas of disputed facts which compel the 
issue of contributory negligence to be de-
termined by the trier offact. First, whether 
he had knowledge of a similar accident 
which occurred one month prior to his in-
jury. Second, whether his truck actually 
touched the wires or whether the electrical 
shock was caused by an arcing effect with-
out contact. Third, whether the sunlight 
affected his ability to see the wires at the 
time of the accident. The court dismissed 
these contentions as immaterial, and found 
that Liscombe knew of the presence and 
inherent danger presented by the wires 
and that this was enough to establish his 
negligence. 
The court relied on its decision in State 
v. Potomac Edison Company, 166 Md. 
138, 170 A. 568 (1934), in deciding that 
the undisputed facts were sufficient to find 
Liscombe guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. In this case the 
court held that "[i]f [the injured person] 
knew or should have known that the wire 
was dangerous, it follows as of course that 
he was negligent in touching it, or in com-
ing near enough to it to receive the shock." 
Id., at 147,170 A. at 571. The court went 
on to identify three elements, as stated in 
Stancill v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 744 
F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which must be 
established before the plaintiff can be 
deemed negligent because he assumed the 
risk. The plaintiff must have "(1) had 
knowledge of the risk of danger, (2) appre-
ciated that risk and (3) voluntarily exposed 
himself to it." /d. at 866. 
While the court in Stancill spoke in 
terms of assumption of risk, in the case at 
bar the court held these elements also 
prove negligence in cases involving elec-
trical accidents. The court went on to state 
that in Maryland, electrical accident cases 
have historically fallen under the contrib-
utory negligence theory rather than as-
sumption of risk. 
After determining that the plaintiff vol-
untarily exposed himself to the admittedly 
dangerous wires and thus his own negli-
gence contributed to his injury, the court 
addressed whether the defendants were 
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